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“Today’s proposal on the ETS review brings together three key goals: sustained truly ambitious climate action, much more competitiveness, and a huge boost for our independence.” Wopke Hoekstra chose his words carefully on 17 July, giving the ETS two new jobs that were never its. The ETS has always had the job of pricing carbon and letting such price incentivize abatement.
The 2026 review attaches competitiveness and investment to the ETS, funded by allowance revenues and aimed at keeping energy-intensive production in Europe on the way to a 90% emissions cut by 2040 and net zero by 2050. Each added objective is another lever for moving supply, and therefore price.
On 17 July, the day of the EC revision publication, the benchmark EUA contract traded a €4.1 range, printing €76.92 before recovering towards €80, a repricing of the gap between expectations and the technical text, not of the abatement stack.
The Commission listed 21 changes to the 2023 ETS Directive, from the linear reduction factor and the MSR to an Investment Booster, a successor Investment Decarbonisation Bank, revenue treatment, CBAM interaction and new sectors.
Most concerns the post 2030 cap trajectory. However, two of the changes bite the near curve, the MSR and the investment booster treatment, which directly affect the risk reward perception of the market.
From Surplus Manager to Liquidity Valve
The MSR was built to mop up a historic oversupply of EUAs. The Commission now wants it dynamic, responsive to market conditions rather than fixed thresholds, building on the removal of the invalidation clause. The logic is defensible as the structural surplus is declining as power-sector demand falls, with industry to follow. The changes phase in over 2028–29.
2028
From 2029, the MSR will operate under its full set of rules decreasing by a linear 4%/yr, making the system more responsive to hedging dynamics.
The design pulls in two ways, one that envisioned to restrict supply for longer, and one that offers relief when the surplus becomes way too little.
Fewer allowances diverted in surplus years also means steadier auction volumes, richer liquidity, better cover ratios, but an open question around clearance. The change will especially impact specs behaviour into late 2020s and further down the curve onto whether or not the MSR would steepen the forward curve.
The Aviation Correction Is the Bearish Detail
In addition, the detail worth attention is the 173 Mt of aviation allowances stripped from the TNAC to correct a historical error. A cut that size plausibly pushes the TNAC below the 833 Mt mid threshold, which itself steps down 4% a year. Falling thresholds and an administratively shrunken surplus risk leaving the reserve dormant 2028 onwards.
The Booster: 400m Allowances and the Timing That Matters
The Investment Decarbonisation Bank would fund technologies that directly cut emissions at stationary installations, in two phases.
2028–2031, Investment Booster: 400m EUAs reserved to pay a fixed premium, first-come, first-served, conditional on strict completion deadlines and backed by a completion bond, with payments linked to independently verified emissions avoidance and deliverable in allowances.
The 400m headline matters less than the timing and mechanics of interacting with the cap. Allowances “shall be available for projects in the first 18 months of operation”.
In essence, allowances are granted at the beginning of construction; but its actual delivery arrives later and depends on completion. An equal annual distribution would have left the middle years of the second allocation period (2026-2030) oversupplied but would have enabled the functionality of the MSR in fullness.
Bond, Deadline and Payout
The Commission will set the premium rate, bond size, eligibility and MRV rules, and may revise the rate.
Dividing by the trailing auction price means a stronger carbon price reduces the volume needed to deliver a given premium, and weaker carbon price expands it, a negative-feedback loop, and a dampener on realised volatility once the booster is live.
Winners, and the Balance of Risk
The “First-come, first-served” principle favours those that are permit-ready and can commit capital fast; they collect a premium and an allowance stream that balances the carbon price they already pay. Utilities gain a supply mechanism less prone to sudden tightening.
The risk is two-sided. Bullish risk is tied to conditionality and the 30-month test, as they mean a material share of the 400m may arrive late or never, and a dormant MSR removes the release valve as well as the squeeze.
The bearish fold is concerning writing competitiveness into the system’s purpose as it sets a precedent for intervening when prices rise faster than industry can absorb. That precedent is the biggest repricing risk here, and it is un-modellable.
On the macro side, the proposal is coherent as it leaves the price signal intact. In addition, the revenue recycled into European capacity is an answer to the deindustrialisation argument that produced the sharpest volatility of the cycle around February’s Antwerp summit.
Passage is another matter. Parliament and member states come next, the outcome distribution is wide, and a word from Berlin or Rome can reshape it.
Podcast>
In this episode of Carbon Trading Chronicles, Lewis Unstead from ICIS joins us to discuss the upcoming EU ETS review, industry competitiveness and the political and ma.....